The 2025/26 cherry season in Argentina is nearing its end with a complex situation, marked by a significantly earlier production schedule, a substantial impact from the weather in the main growing regions, and a challenging international context due to chilean oversupply.
This is how Aníbal Caminiti, manager of the Argentine Chamber of Integrated Cherry Producers (CAPCI), describes it, providing a detailed analysis of the season’s development, export markets, costs, and the sector’s structural challenges.
According to Caminiti, the season hadn’t yet ended at the time of the interview, but it was expected to close during the first weekend of February, approximately ten days earlier than usual. “In normal years, the season ends around February 20th. This year it will end around the 7th,” he notes, emphasizing that the earlier start wasn’t limited to one region, but rather a widespread phenomenon across much of the country and the Southern Hemisphere.
The weather as a determining factor
One of the main factors explaining this atypical behavior was the weather. In particular, the high temperatures recorded during January accelerated the fruit’s phenological processes. “Last year, the maximum temperature in January was 23 degrees Celsius; this year we reached 34, with several days above 30 degrees. That’s completely unusual,” Caminiti remarks.
This scenario led to an abrupt acceleration of ripening and a significant overlap of varieties during the harvest. “When I arrived at a farm and asked what variety they were harvesting, they told me ‘all of them.’ That perfectly illustrates what happened,” he explains. The same phenomenon was observed in the Upper Valley of Río Negro and Neuquén, where the harvest ended around December 12, when it normally extends until Christmas or even beyond.
For Caminiti, even though there isn’t yet a thorough statistical analysis to confirm it, these events are beginning to be perceived as recurring. “It’s a personal observation, but it seems we’re entering a new climate pattern, with higher temperatures and an earlier harvest. And that has very concrete consequences for production.”
Among those consequences is the need for much more intensive and efficient logistics. “When everything shrinks and is concentrated into fewer days, more management, more coordination, and higher costs are required for harvesting and post-harvesting,” he states.
Production affected and exports in decline
In terms of production, the season was negative, especially in the Upper Valley region. The losses recorded in Río Negro and Neuquén had a direct impact on the country’s total export volume. “Last year, 56% of Argentina’s exported volume came from Río Negro and Neuquén. With that region suffering so much, the impact was very significant,” explains Caminiti.
The figures reflect this situation: by the end of January, approximately 4,660 tons had been exported, and with luck, they will reach 5,000 tons by the end of the season, a lower volume than in previous seasons.
“It’s part of the game,” admits the CAPCI manager, although he acknowledges that the drop in volume complicates the sector’s overall profitability, especially in a context of pressured international prices.
Lower prices and strong chilean competition
In foreign markets, the dominant factor was the increased presence of Chilean cherries. “There was more Chilean supply in all markets, and prices fell everywhere,” Caminiti summarizes.
However, in some destinations, Argentine fruit managed to differentiate itself. In Europe, the Middle East, Singapore, and parts of Southeast Asia, Argentine cherries shipped by air managed to outperform Chilean cherries shipped by sea, recovering some value in January. However, this recovery was not enough to reach the levels of the previous season.
In the United States, the situation was more complex. The strong Chilean presence generated a general downward price adjustment, with lower returns for Argentine exporters, especially in January. “The early November fruit from the Alto Valle region is not the same as the fruit from Chubut, which appears at the end of December. That also influences the results,” he clarifies.
China, for its part, once again became the most important market for Chile, absorbing approximately 85% of its exported volume. However, it also failed to show the expected price reaction. “The Chinese New Year was very late and offset the peak of Chilean supply. That fruit remained in the markets, and prices didn’t rise,” Caminiti explains. Although a reaction was expected in the first days of February, the market was already weakened.
The chilean “purge” and a changing landscape
Given this context, Caminiti observes a process of structural adjustment in the Chilean industry. “Chile has already begun a purge. Between last season and this one, several exporters closed, and that’s going to continue,” he asserts. The phenomenon isn’t limited to exporting companies; it also affects production facilities and packing plants.
“When there are profit margins, we all allow ourselves certain liberties. When margins disappear, those who aren’t efficient are left behind,” he explains. The chilean strategy of selling off containers at auction to cover costs this season has further complicated matters for other suppliers, including Argentina.
However, Caminiti points out a key difference between the two production models: “Our companies are integrated: they manage everything from primary production to export. In Chile, a large part of the supply comes from producers who deliver their fruit to a packing plant. That completely changes the numbers.”
This integration allows Argentine companies greater quality control, more precise decisions about harvest time, and greater commercial flexibility, especially for air shipments. “When you work with full containers and large volumes, if the market doesn’t respond, you’re forced to sell off or throw away the fruit,” he explains.
Internal costs and structural challenges
When asked about the exchange rate and competitiveness compared to countries like Chile, South Africa, or Australia, Caminiti is cautious. He acknowledges not having a detailed comparative analysis, but emphasizes that Argentina’s main problem isn’t solely related to the dollar.
“The real problem is the cost structure: labor, taxes, energy, and logistics. We haven’t seen any structural changes in those areas,” he maintains. Added to this is the high logistics cost faced by producers in the Alto Valle region, who operate from one of the country’s most expensive hubs during the peak season for perishable goods exports.
Paradoxically, Buenos Aires is more convenient for chilean exporters than for Argentinians themselves. “Airfare from Buenos Aires is cheaper for chileans traveling to Europe or Asia, and there are also more flights. But that increases our costs and leaves us without available warehouse space,” he explains.
Domestic market: Better performance than last season
Regarding imports, Caminiti confirms that they continued to grow, although with a different trend than last year. According to testimonies from producers and operators at the Central Market, argentinian fruit positioned itself better than Chilean fruit in terms of quality and price.
“The demand for domestic fruit was higher. The chilean fruit that arrived, with few exceptions, was of lower quality. This year, argentine cherries were better positioned in the domestic market,” he concludes.
The final analysis of the season will be carried out in mid- to late February, once all shipments are complete and the data is consolidated. But the outlook already makes it clear that Argentine cherries face an increasingly demanding environment, where weather, production efficiency, and structural costs will be key to maintaining their competitiveness in the coming years.
Source: Más Producción
